At Black Hat USA 2024, security researchers presented a systematic analysis of privilege abuse in Microsoft Copilot deployments. A key finding: when Copilot delegated tasks to sub-agents or plugins, it often passed its full organizational access context — not a scoped subset.
This meant an attacker who could influence a sub-agent's behavior (through injected instructions in a document, email, or data source the agent processed) could effectively operate with Copilot's full privilege level — including access to files, emails, and internal data the attacker's account had no direct access to.
The agent was the confused deputy. Its broad delegation made it a high-privilege proxy for low-privilege or external attackers.
A published CVE in 2025 documented a privilege escalation path in an agentic system where task delegation did not enforce scope boundaries. A low-privilege principal could trigger a delegation chain that ultimately executed actions at a higher privilege level than the original requester was authorized for.
This is the textbook Type 1 AG03 pattern — un-scoped inheritance in a delegation chain turning a restricted user into an effective admin through the agent layer.