| Attack / Scenario | MIT01 Auth |
MIT02 Signing |
MIT03 TLS |
MIT04 Validation |
MIT05 Replay |
MIT06 Routing |
MIT07 Registry |
MIT08 Logging |
MIT09 Anomaly |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T1 — Message forgery | ● | ◉ | ◉ | ◉ | ◉ | ● | ◉ | ◉ | |
| T2 — Tampering in transit | ● | ◉ | ◉ | ◉ | |||||
| T3 — Orchestrator impersonation | ● | ◉ | ● | ● | ● | ◉ | ◉ | ||
| T4 — Replay attack | ◉ | ● | ◉ | ◉ | |||||
| T5 — Eavesdropping | ● | ||||||||
| T6 — Queue injection | ● | ◉ | ● | ◉ | ◉ | ◉ |
MIT01 + MIT03 + MIT06 + MIT07 form the identity and routing foundation — they appear as primary controls for four of the six attack types. Every other control builds on top of this foundation.
MIT02 is the only primary control for Type 2 (tampering). No other mitigation directly prevents message tampering once the channel is authenticated. This means MIT02 (message signing) is non-negotiable if tamper-resistance is required — TLS alone is insufficient because TLS only protects transport, not the message body at application layer.
Type 5 (eavesdropping) has only one primary control: MIT03 (TLS). If TLS is absent, eavesdropping cannot be prevented by any other mitigation on this list.