Slide 6 of 27
Part 1 · What Is It?Slide 6
Slide 6 · The Outcomes
What can an attacker actually achieve?
Four distinct harms — each with a real-world example coming in Part 2.
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Manipulated AI Responses
Poisoned retrieval makes the AI say what the attacker wants — false project status, incorrect guidance, manipulated summaries delivered to decision-makers.
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Confidential Data Exposure
Vectors holding sensitive documents can be queried to surface private content across user boundaries, or the vectors themselves decoded to reconstruct source text.
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Cross-Tenant Leakage
In multi-user or multi-org deployments, embeddings from one group bleed into responses for another — leaking confidential business data across organizational boundaries.
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Persistent Compromise
Once a poisoned embedding is in the store, it continues influencing responses even after the source document is deleted — until the knowledge base is fully reindexed.
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