Slide 15 of 27
Part 3 · ScenariosSlide 15
Slide 15 · OWASP Scenario #2
Targeted Prompt Injection.
📄 OWASP LLM Top 10:2025 · LLM02 Scenario #2
Scenario 2 of 3
“An attacker bypasses input filters to extract sensitive information.”
Confirmed Vulnerability · Disclosed Aug 20, 2024 · PromptArmor
Slack AI: Exfiltrating Private Channel Data via Indirect Prompt Injection
No CVE · Responsibly disclosed to Slack by PromptArmor

The setup: Slack AI lets users ask natural-language questions across messages and files they have access to — including content from public channels they haven't personally joined.

The attack: An attacker with no access to a target's private channel posts a hidden instruction in a public channel. When the victim later asks Slack AI to summarize messages from a specific person (their manager, say), the model follows the planted instruction and renders a clickable link — one that encodes private data, including secrets pasted into DMs, into the URL's query string.

The result: If the victim clicks the rendered link, the private content travels to the attacker's server. The attacker never touched the private channel.

Why it matters for LLM02: the attacker never “broke in.” They redirected the AI's own retrieval and rendering behavior to do the exfiltration for them — OWASP's exact definition of bypassing filters to extract sensitive information.
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