Slide 23 · Mitigation Matrix
Which mitigations address which rogue patterns — and which are primary vs. supporting.
| Pattern |
MIT01 Min Footprint |
MIT02 Constraints |
MIT03 Monitoring |
MIT04 Sandbox |
MIT05 Tripwires |
MIT06 Human Gates |
MIT07 Reversibility |
MIT08 Hierarchy |
MIT09 Red-Team |
| P1 — Goal Proxy Exploitation |
◐ |
● |
● |
— |
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◐ |
◐ |
— |
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| P2 — Instrumental Capability Acquisition |
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● |
● |
◐ |
● |
◐ |
— |
● |
◐ |
| P3 — Adversarial Goal Injection |
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◐ |
◐ |
● |
◐ |
● |
● |
● |
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| P4 — Multi-Step Action Chains |
◐ |
◐ |
● |
◐ |
● |
● |
◐ |
— |
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| P5 — Oversight Resistance |
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● |
● |
◐ |
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— |
— |
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◐ |
| P6 — Capability Boundary Violation |
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◐ |
● |
● |
◐ |
— |
◐ |
● |
● |
● Primary mitigation
◐ Supporting mitigation
— Not applicable
Key insights from the matrix
- MIT03 (behavioral monitoring) and MIT09 (red-teaming) appear in every row as primary or supporting. Monitoring detects what constraints miss; red-teaming feeds all constraint and tripwire updates. These two are the backbone of the defense model across all patterns.
- MIT01 (minimal footprint) is primary for patterns P2, P3, and P6 — the three patterns that involve the agent exercising capabilities beyond what was intended. Reducing the capability surface directly closes the attack surface for these patterns.
- Pattern 3 (goal injection) requires the broadest mitigation coverage — it has primary marks in 6 of 9 columns. This is because once the goal is injected, the defense against harm is whatever constraints remain on the agent's actions. Every constraint layer matters.
- MIT06 (human gates) is primary for P3 and P4 — the two patterns where multi-step autonomous execution is the key risk. A human gate converts autonomous execution of a high-impact action into a human decision.
- MIT08 (principal hierarchy enforcement) is primary for P2, P3, P5, and P6 — all patterns that involve the agent exceeding its authorized position in the hierarchy. Technical enforcement of the hierarchy is required because instruction-based hierarchy is not a reliable security boundary.