Slide 20 of 28
Part 4 — PreventionSlide 20
Slide 20 · MIT03 + MIT04 — Memory Access Controls and TTL
MIT03: Enforce strict isolation between users and tenants in the memory layer. MIT04: Every memory entry expires — limiting how long a poisoned belief can persist.
MIT03 — Memory access controls and isolation

The most direct defense against cross-user memory leakage (Type 6) and multi-agent contamination (Type 5) is strict namespace isolation in the memory store — enforced at the data layer, not just the application layer.

True namespace isolation: Each user, session, or tenant should have a dedicated namespace in the vector store. Retrieval queries are scoped to the namespace at the database level — the filter cannot be bypassed by application-layer prompt injection because the query never touches other namespaces.

Write permission controls: Specify explicitly which identities can write to which namespaces. An agent processing inbound email should only be able to write to a designated "inbound-derived" namespace — not to the curated knowledge namespace or another user's preference store. Write permissions should be as restrictive as read permissions.

Multi-agent memory boundaries: In multi-agent pipelines, shared memory should be structured as a message-passing store with explicit write attribution — not as a common-pool store where any agent can write anywhere. Agents should be able to read from shared memory but write only to their own designated output namespace.

MIT04 — Memory TTL and expiration policies

Poisoned memories persist until they are explicitly removed. If memory entries never expire, a successful poisoning event has an unlimited persistence window. TTL policies limit this window automatically.

Tier-specific TTL: In-context memory is ephemeral by definition. Session episodic memory might persist for weeks to months. Long-term preference entries should have the longest TTL but still expire and require re-confirmation — not persist forever. Curated knowledge base entries should have explicit version dates and be replaced on update, not indefinitely accumulated.

Confirmation-required renewal: High-trust entries (behavioral rules, authorizations, policies) should require an explicit human confirmation action to renew their TTL — not auto-renew. If no human confirms the entry is still valid, it expires and must be re-established through a validated channel.

💼 Business takeaway

Ask your team: can your AI agent's memory from one customer's session ever influence another customer's session? Also ask whether memories your agents store have an expiry date — or whether they accumulate indefinitely, including potentially poisoned ones.

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