| Attack / Scenario | M1 Least priv. |
M2 Action auth. |
M3 Sandbox |
M4 Intent gate |
M5 Budget |
M6 JIT access |
M7 Semantic+log |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AgentFlayer — 0-click Copilot Studio exfilOver-broad tool defaults → data forwarded | ✓ | ✓ | ~ | ✓ | ~ | ✓ | |
| Amazon Q — Secrets via DNSPrompt injection → secrets encoded in DNS queries | ~ | ✓ | ✓ | ~ | ✓ | ✓ | |
| MCP Tool Descriptor Poisoning — GitHubMalicious descriptor metadata → private repo exfil | ✓ | ✓ | ~ | ✓ | ✓ | ||
| EDR Bypass — Tool Chain (PowerShell + cURL)Injected instruction → legitimate tools exfil logs | ✓ | ~ | ✓ | ✓ | ~ | ✓ | |
| DNS Ping Exfil — Approved tool as covert channelAgent pings hostnames encoding stolen data | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ||
| CRM + Email Chain (S04)CRM query chained with external email → data exfil | ✓ | ✓ | ~ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |
| Loop Amplification (S09)Agent calls costly API in unbounded loop → DoS/bill | ~ | ✓ | ✓ |
✓ = this mitigation directly addresses the attack vector or limits its impact. ~ = partial coverage. Empty = does not address this path.
MIT 01 (Least Privilege) and MIT 04 (Intent Gate) cover the most attacks. If you can only implement two, start there. MIT 03 (Sandbox) + MIT 07 (Monitoring) form the best detection and containment layer. MIT 05 (Budget) is the only control that reliably stops loop amplification.